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//! # [Autocrypt Peer State](https://autocrypt.org/level1.html#peer-state-management) module.
use std::mem;
use anyhow::{Context as _, Error, Result};
use deltachat_contact_tools::{addr_cmp, ContactAddress};
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use crate::aheader::{Aheader, EncryptPreference};
use crate::chat::{self, Chat};
use crate::chatlist::Chatlist;
use crate::config::Config;
use crate::constants::Chattype;
use crate::contact::{Contact, Origin};
use crate::context::Context;
use crate::events::EventType;
use crate::key::{DcKey, Fingerprint, SignedPublicKey};
use crate::message::Message;
use crate::mimeparser::SystemMessage;
use crate::sql::Sql;
use crate::{chatlist_events, stock_str};
/// Type of the public key stored inside the peerstate.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum PeerstateKeyType {
/// Public key sent in the `Autocrypt-Gossip` header.
GossipKey,
/// Public key sent in the `Autocrypt` header.
PublicKey,
}
/// Peerstate represents the state of an Autocrypt peer.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
pub struct Peerstate {
/// E-mail address of the contact.
pub addr: String,
/// Timestamp of the latest peerstate update.
///
/// Updated when a message is received from a contact,
/// either with or without `Autocrypt` header.
pub last_seen: i64,
/// Timestamp of the latest `Autocrypt` header reception.
pub last_seen_autocrypt: i64,
/// Encryption preference of the contact.
pub prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference,
/// Public key of the contact received in `Autocrypt` header.
pub public_key: Option<SignedPublicKey>,
/// Fingerprint of the contact public key.
pub public_key_fingerprint: Option<Fingerprint>,
/// Public key of the contact received in `Autocrypt-Gossip` header.
pub gossip_key: Option<SignedPublicKey>,
/// Timestamp of the latest `Autocrypt-Gossip` header reception.
///
/// It is stored to avoid applying outdated gossiped key
/// from delayed or reordered messages.
pub gossip_timestamp: i64,
/// Fingerprint of the contact gossip key.
pub gossip_key_fingerprint: Option<Fingerprint>,
/// Public key of the contact at the time it was verified,
/// either directly or via gossip from the verified contact.
pub verified_key: Option<SignedPublicKey>,
/// Fingerprint of the verified public key.
pub verified_key_fingerprint: Option<Fingerprint>,
/// The address that introduced this verified key.
pub verifier: Option<String>,
/// Secondary public verified key of the contact.
/// It could be a contact gossiped by another verified contact in a shared group
/// or a key that was previously used as a verified key.
pub secondary_verified_key: Option<SignedPublicKey>,
/// Fingerprint of the secondary verified public key.
pub secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: Option<Fingerprint>,
/// The address that introduced secondary verified key.
pub secondary_verifier: Option<String>,
/// Row ID of the key in the `keypairs` table
/// that we think the peer knows as verified.
pub backward_verified_key_id: Option<i64>,
/// True if it was detected
/// that the fingerprint of the key used in chats with
/// opportunistic encryption was changed after Peerstate creation.
pub fingerprint_changed: bool,
}
impl Peerstate {
/// Creates a peerstate from the `Autocrypt` header.
pub fn from_header(header: &Aheader, message_time: i64) -> Self {
Self::from_public_key(
&header.addr,
message_time,
header.prefer_encrypt,
&header.public_key,
)
}
/// Creates a peerstate from the given public key.
pub fn from_public_key(
addr: &str,
last_seen: i64,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference,
public_key: &SignedPublicKey,
) -> Self {
Peerstate {
addr: addr.to_string(),
last_seen,
last_seen_autocrypt: last_seen,
prefer_encrypt,
public_key: Some(public_key.clone()),
public_key_fingerprint: Some(public_key.fingerprint()),
gossip_key: None,
gossip_key_fingerprint: None,
gossip_timestamp: 0,
verified_key: None,
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
verifier: None,
secondary_verified_key: None,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
secondary_verifier: None,
backward_verified_key_id: None,
fingerprint_changed: false,
}
}
/// Create a peerstate from the `Autocrypt-Gossip` header.
pub fn from_gossip(gossip_header: &Aheader, message_time: i64) -> Self {
Peerstate {
addr: gossip_header.addr.clone(),
last_seen: 0,
last_seen_autocrypt: 0,
// Non-standard extension. According to Autocrypt 1.1.0 gossip headers SHOULD NOT
// contain encryption preference.
//
// Delta Chat includes encryption preference to ensure new users introduced to a group
// learn encryption preferences of other members immediately and don't send unencrypted
// messages to a group where everyone prefers encryption.
prefer_encrypt: gossip_header.prefer_encrypt,
public_key: None,
public_key_fingerprint: None,
gossip_key: Some(gossip_header.public_key.clone()),
gossip_key_fingerprint: Some(gossip_header.public_key.fingerprint()),
gossip_timestamp: message_time,
verified_key: None,
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
verifier: None,
secondary_verified_key: None,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
secondary_verifier: None,
backward_verified_key_id: None,
fingerprint_changed: false,
}
}
/// Loads peerstate corresponding to the given address from the database.
pub async fn from_addr(context: &Context, addr: &str) -> Result<Option<Peerstate>> {
if context.is_self_addr(addr).await? {
return Ok(None);
}
let query = "SELECT addr, last_seen, last_seen_autocrypt, prefer_encrypted, public_key, \
gossip_timestamp, gossip_key, public_key_fingerprint, gossip_key_fingerprint, \
verified_key, verified_key_fingerprint, \
verifier, \
secondary_verified_key, secondary_verified_key_fingerprint, \
secondary_verifier, \
backward_verified_key_id \
FROM acpeerstates \
WHERE addr=? COLLATE NOCASE LIMIT 1;";
Self::from_stmt(context, query, (addr,)).await
}
/// Loads peerstate corresponding to the given fingerprint from the database.
pub async fn from_fingerprint(
context: &Context,
fingerprint: &Fingerprint,
) -> Result<Option<Peerstate>> {
// NOTE: If it's our key fingerprint, this returns None currently.
let query = "SELECT addr, last_seen, last_seen_autocrypt, prefer_encrypted, public_key, \
gossip_timestamp, gossip_key, public_key_fingerprint, gossip_key_fingerprint, \
verified_key, verified_key_fingerprint, \
verifier, \
secondary_verified_key, secondary_verified_key_fingerprint, \
secondary_verifier, \
backward_verified_key_id \
FROM acpeerstates \
WHERE public_key_fingerprint=? \
OR gossip_key_fingerprint=? \
ORDER BY public_key_fingerprint=? DESC LIMIT 1;";
let fp = fingerprint.hex();
Self::from_stmt(context, query, (&fp, &fp, &fp)).await
}
/// Loads peerstate by address or verified fingerprint.
///
/// If the address is different but verified fingerprint is the same,
/// peerstate with corresponding verified fingerprint is preferred.
pub async fn from_verified_fingerprint_or_addr(
context: &Context,
fingerprint: &Fingerprint,
addr: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Peerstate>> {
if context.is_self_addr(addr).await? {
return Ok(None);
}
let query = "SELECT addr, last_seen, last_seen_autocrypt, prefer_encrypted, public_key, \
gossip_timestamp, gossip_key, public_key_fingerprint, gossip_key_fingerprint, \
verified_key, verified_key_fingerprint, \
verifier, \
secondary_verified_key, secondary_verified_key_fingerprint, \
secondary_verifier, \
backward_verified_key_id \
FROM acpeerstates \
WHERE verified_key_fingerprint=? \
OR addr=? COLLATE NOCASE \
ORDER BY verified_key_fingerprint=? DESC, addr=? COLLATE NOCASE DESC, \
last_seen DESC LIMIT 1;";
let fp = fingerprint.hex();
Self::from_stmt(context, query, (&fp, addr, &fp, addr)).await
}
async fn from_stmt(
context: &Context,
query: &str,
params: impl rusqlite::Params + Send,
) -> Result<Option<Peerstate>> {
let peerstate = context
.sql
.query_row_optional(query, params, |row| {
let res = Peerstate {
addr: row.get("addr")?,
last_seen: row.get("last_seen")?,
last_seen_autocrypt: row.get("last_seen_autocrypt")?,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::from_i32(row.get("prefer_encrypted")?)
.unwrap_or_default(),
public_key: row
.get("public_key")
.ok()
.and_then(|blob: Vec<u8>| SignedPublicKey::from_slice(&blob).ok()),
public_key_fingerprint: row
.get::<_, Option<String>>("public_key_fingerprint")?
.map(|s| s.parse::<Fingerprint>())
.transpose()
.unwrap_or_default(),
gossip_key: row
.get("gossip_key")
.ok()
.and_then(|blob: Vec<u8>| SignedPublicKey::from_slice(&blob).ok()),
gossip_key_fingerprint: row
.get::<_, Option<String>>("gossip_key_fingerprint")?
.map(|s| s.parse::<Fingerprint>())
.transpose()
.unwrap_or_default(),
gossip_timestamp: row.get("gossip_timestamp")?,
verified_key: row
.get("verified_key")
.ok()
.and_then(|blob: Vec<u8>| SignedPublicKey::from_slice(&blob).ok()),
verified_key_fingerprint: row
.get::<_, Option<String>>("verified_key_fingerprint")?
.map(|s| s.parse::<Fingerprint>())
.transpose()
.unwrap_or_default(),
verifier: {
let verifier: Option<String> = row.get("verifier")?;
verifier.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
},
secondary_verified_key: row
.get("secondary_verified_key")
.ok()
.and_then(|blob: Vec<u8>| SignedPublicKey::from_slice(&blob).ok()),
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: row
.get::<_, Option<String>>("secondary_verified_key_fingerprint")?
.map(|s| s.parse::<Fingerprint>())
.transpose()
.unwrap_or_default(),
secondary_verifier: {
let secondary_verifier: Option<String> = row.get("secondary_verifier")?;
secondary_verifier.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
},
backward_verified_key_id: row.get("backward_verified_key_id")?,
fingerprint_changed: false,
};
Ok(res)
})
.await?;
Ok(peerstate)
}
/// Re-calculate `self.public_key_fingerprint` and `self.gossip_key_fingerprint`.
/// If one of them was changed, `self.fingerprint_changed` is set to `true`.
///
/// Call this after you changed `self.public_key` or `self.gossip_key`.
pub fn recalc_fingerprint(&mut self) {
if let Some(ref public_key) = self.public_key {
let old_public_fingerprint = self.public_key_fingerprint.take();
self.public_key_fingerprint = Some(public_key.fingerprint());
if old_public_fingerprint.is_some()
&& old_public_fingerprint != self.public_key_fingerprint
{
self.fingerprint_changed = true;
}
}
if let Some(ref gossip_key) = self.gossip_key {
let old_gossip_fingerprint = self.gossip_key_fingerprint.take();
self.gossip_key_fingerprint = Some(gossip_key.fingerprint());
if old_gossip_fingerprint.is_none()
|| self.gossip_key_fingerprint.is_none()
|| old_gossip_fingerprint != self.gossip_key_fingerprint
{
// Warn about gossip key change only if there is no public key obtained from
// Autocrypt header, which overrides gossip key.
if old_gossip_fingerprint.is_some() && self.public_key_fingerprint.is_none() {
self.fingerprint_changed = true;
}
}
}
}
/// Reset Autocrypt peerstate.
///
/// Used when it is detected that the contact no longer uses Autocrypt.
pub fn degrade_encryption(&mut self, message_time: i64) {
self.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Reset;
self.last_seen = message_time;
}
/// Updates peerstate according to the given `Autocrypt` header.
pub fn apply_header(&mut self, header: &Aheader, message_time: i64) {
if !addr_cmp(&self.addr, &header.addr) {
return;
}
if message_time >= self.last_seen {
self.last_seen = message_time;
self.last_seen_autocrypt = message_time;
if (header.prefer_encrypt == EncryptPreference::Mutual
|| header.prefer_encrypt == EncryptPreference::NoPreference)
&& header.prefer_encrypt != self.prefer_encrypt
{
self.prefer_encrypt = header.prefer_encrypt;
}
if self.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&header.public_key) {
self.public_key = Some(header.public_key.clone());
self.recalc_fingerprint();
}
}
}
/// Updates peerstate according to the given `Autocrypt-Gossip` header.
pub fn apply_gossip(&mut self, gossip_header: &Aheader, message_time: i64) {
if self.addr.to_lowercase() != gossip_header.addr.to_lowercase() {
return;
}
if message_time >= self.gossip_timestamp {
self.gossip_timestamp = message_time;
if self.gossip_key.as_ref() != Some(&gossip_header.public_key) {
self.gossip_key = Some(gossip_header.public_key.clone());
self.recalc_fingerprint();
}
// This is non-standard.
//
// According to Autocrypt 1.1.0 gossip headers SHOULD NOT
// contain encryption preference, but we include it into
// Autocrypt-Gossip and apply it one way (from
// "nopreference" to "mutual").
//
// This is compatible to standard clients, because they
// can't distinguish it from the case where we have
// contacted the client in the past and received this
// preference via Autocrypt header.
if self.last_seen_autocrypt == 0
&& self.prefer_encrypt == EncryptPreference::NoPreference
&& gossip_header.prefer_encrypt == EncryptPreference::Mutual
{
self.prefer_encrypt = EncryptPreference::Mutual;
}
};
}
/// Returns the contents of the `Autocrypt-Gossip` header for outgoing messages.
pub fn render_gossip_header(&self, verified: bool) -> Option<String> {
if let Some(key) = self.peek_key(verified) {
let header = Aheader::new(
self.addr.clone(),
key.clone(), // TODO: avoid cloning
// Autocrypt 1.1.0 specification says that
// `prefer-encrypt` attribute SHOULD NOT be included,
// but we include it anyway to propagate encryption
// preference to new members in group chats.
if self.last_seen_autocrypt > 0 {
self.prefer_encrypt
} else {
EncryptPreference::NoPreference
},
);
Some(header.to_string())
} else {
None
}
}
/// Converts the peerstate into the contact public key.
///
/// Similar to [`Self::peek_key`], but consumes the peerstate and returns owned key.
pub fn take_key(mut self, verified: bool) -> Option<SignedPublicKey> {
if verified {
self.verified_key.take()
} else {
self.public_key.take().or_else(|| self.gossip_key.take())
}
}
/// Returns a reference to the contact public key.
///
/// `verified` determines the required verification status of the key.
/// If verified key is requested, returns the verified key,
/// otherwise returns the Autocrypt key.
///
/// Returned key is suitable for sending in `Autocrypt-Gossip` header.
///
/// Returns `None` if there is no suitable public key.
pub fn peek_key(&self, verified: bool) -> Option<&SignedPublicKey> {
if verified {
self.verified_key.as_ref()
} else {
self.public_key.as_ref().or(self.gossip_key.as_ref())
}
}
/// Returns a reference to the contact's public key fingerprint.
///
/// Similar to [`Self::peek_key`], but returns the fingerprint instead of the key.
fn peek_key_fingerprint(&self, verified: bool) -> Option<&Fingerprint> {
if verified {
self.verified_key_fingerprint.as_ref()
} else {
self.public_key_fingerprint
.as_ref()
.or(self.gossip_key_fingerprint.as_ref())
}
}
/// Returns true if the key used for opportunistic encryption in the 1:1 chat
/// is the same as the verified key.
///
/// Note that verified groups always use the verified key no matter if the
/// opportunistic key matches or not.
pub(crate) fn is_using_verified_key(&self) -> bool {
let verified = self.peek_key_fingerprint(true);
verified.is_some() && verified == self.peek_key_fingerprint(false)
}
pub(crate) async fn is_backward_verified(&self, context: &Context) -> Result<bool> {
let Some(backward_verified_key_id) = self.backward_verified_key_id else {
return Ok(false);
};
let self_key_id = context.get_config_i64(Config::KeyId).await?;
let backward_verified = backward_verified_key_id == self_key_id;
Ok(backward_verified)
}
/// Set this peerstate to verified;
/// make sure to call `self.save_to_db` to save these changes.
///
/// Params:
///
/// * key: The new verified key.
/// * fingerprint: Only set to verified if the key's fingerprint matches this.
/// * verifier:
/// The address which introduces the given contact.
/// If we are verifying the contact, use that contacts address.
pub fn set_verified(
&mut self,
key: SignedPublicKey,
fingerprint: Fingerprint,
verifier: String,
) -> Result<()> {
if key.fingerprint() == fingerprint {
self.verified_key = Some(key);
self.verified_key_fingerprint = Some(fingerprint);
self.verifier = Some(verifier);
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::msg(format!(
"{fingerprint} is not peer's key fingerprint",
)))
}
}
/// Sets the gossiped key as the secondary verified key.
///
/// If gossiped key is the same as the current verified key,
/// do nothing to avoid overwriting secondary verified key
/// which may be different.
pub fn set_secondary_verified_key(&mut self, gossip_key: SignedPublicKey, verifier: String) {
let fingerprint = gossip_key.fingerprint();
if self.verified_key_fingerprint.as_ref() != Some(&fingerprint) {
self.secondary_verified_key = Some(gossip_key);
self.secondary_verified_key_fingerprint = Some(fingerprint);
self.secondary_verifier = Some(verifier);
}
}
/// Saves the peerstate to the database.
pub async fn save_to_db(&self, sql: &Sql) -> Result<()> {
self.save_to_db_ex(sql, None).await
}
/// Saves the peerstate to the database.
///
/// * `old_addr`: Old address of the peerstate in case of an AEAP transition.
pub(crate) async fn save_to_db_ex(&self, sql: &Sql, old_addr: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
let trans_fn = |t: &mut rusqlite::Transaction| {
if let Some(old_addr) = old_addr {
// We are doing an AEAP transition to the new address and the SQL INSERT below will
// save the existing peerstate as belonging to this new address. We now need to
// "unverify" the peerstate that belongs to the current address in case if the
// contact later wants to move back to the current address. Otherwise the old entry
// will be just found and updated instead of doing AEAP. We can't just delete the
// existing peerstate as this would break encryption to it. This is critical for
// non-verified groups -- if we can't encrypt to the old address, we can't securely
// remove it from the group (to add the new one instead).
t.execute(
"UPDATE acpeerstates \
SET verified_key=NULL, verified_key_fingerprint='', verifier='' \
WHERE addr=?",
(old_addr,),
)?;
}
t.execute(
"INSERT INTO acpeerstates (
last_seen,
last_seen_autocrypt,
prefer_encrypted,
public_key,
gossip_timestamp,
gossip_key,
public_key_fingerprint,
gossip_key_fingerprint,
verified_key,
verified_key_fingerprint,
verifier,
secondary_verified_key,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint,
secondary_verifier,
backward_verified_key_id,
addr)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
ON CONFLICT (addr)
DO UPDATE SET
last_seen = excluded.last_seen,
last_seen_autocrypt = excluded.last_seen_autocrypt,
prefer_encrypted = excluded.prefer_encrypted,
public_key = excluded.public_key,
gossip_timestamp = excluded.gossip_timestamp,
gossip_key = excluded.gossip_key,
public_key_fingerprint = excluded.public_key_fingerprint,
gossip_key_fingerprint = excluded.gossip_key_fingerprint,
verified_key = excluded.verified_key,
verified_key_fingerprint = excluded.verified_key_fingerprint,
verifier = excluded.verifier,
secondary_verified_key = excluded.secondary_verified_key,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint = excluded.secondary_verified_key_fingerprint,
secondary_verifier = excluded.secondary_verifier,
backward_verified_key_id = excluded.backward_verified_key_id",
(
self.last_seen,
self.last_seen_autocrypt,
self.prefer_encrypt as i64,
self.public_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.to_bytes()),
self.gossip_timestamp,
self.gossip_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.to_bytes()),
self.public_key_fingerprint.as_ref().map(|fp| fp.hex()),
self.gossip_key_fingerprint.as_ref().map(|fp| fp.hex()),
self.verified_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.to_bytes()),
self.verified_key_fingerprint.as_ref().map(|fp| fp.hex()),
self.verifier.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
self.secondary_verified_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.to_bytes()),
self.secondary_verified_key_fingerprint
.as_ref()
.map(|fp| fp.hex()),
self.secondary_verifier.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
self.backward_verified_key_id,
&self.addr,
),
)?;
Ok(())
};
sql.transaction(trans_fn).await
}
/// Returns the address that verified the contact
pub fn get_verifier(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.verifier.as_deref()
}
/// Add an info message to all the chats with this contact, informing about
/// a [`PeerstateChange`].
///
/// Also, in the case of an address change (AEAP), replace the old address
/// with the new address in all chats.
async fn handle_setup_change(
&self,
context: &Context,
timestamp: i64,
change: PeerstateChange,
) -> Result<()> {
if context.is_self_addr(&self.addr).await? {
// Do not try to search all the chats with self.
return Ok(());
}
let contact_id = context
.sql
.query_get_value(
"SELECT id FROM contacts WHERE addr=? COLLATE NOCASE;",
(&self.addr,),
)
.await?
.with_context(|| format!("contact with peerstate.addr {:?} not found", &self.addr))?;
let chats = Chatlist::try_load(context, 0, None, Some(contact_id)).await?;
let msg = match &change {
PeerstateChange::FingerprintChange => {
stock_str::contact_setup_changed(context, &self.addr).await
}
PeerstateChange::Aeap(new_addr) => {
let old_contact = Contact::get_by_id(context, contact_id).await?;
stock_str::aeap_addr_changed(
context,
old_contact.get_display_name(),
&self.addr,
new_addr,
)
.await
}
};
for (chat_id, msg_id) in chats.iter() {
let timestamp_sort = if let Some(msg_id) = msg_id {
let lastmsg = Message::load_from_db(context, *msg_id).await?;
lastmsg.timestamp_sort
} else {
context
.sql
.query_get_value(
"SELECT created_timestamp FROM chats WHERE id=?;",
(chat_id,),
)
.await?
.unwrap_or(0)
};
if let PeerstateChange::Aeap(new_addr) = &change {
let chat = Chat::load_from_db(context, *chat_id).await?;
if chat.typ == Chattype::Group && !chat.is_protected() {
// Don't add an info_msg to the group, in order not to make the user think
// that the address was automatically replaced in the group.
continue;
}
// For security reasons, for now, we only do the AEAP transition if the fingerprint
// is verified (that's what from_verified_fingerprint_or_addr() does).
// In order to not have inconsistent group membership state, we then only do the
// transition in verified groups and in broadcast lists.
if (chat.typ == Chattype::Group && chat.is_protected())
|| chat.typ == Chattype::Broadcast
{
match ContactAddress::new(new_addr) {
Ok(new_addr) => {
let (new_contact_id, _) = Contact::add_or_lookup(
context,
"",
&new_addr,
Origin::IncomingUnknownFrom,
)
.await?;
chat::remove_from_chat_contacts_table(context, *chat_id, contact_id)
.await?;
chat::add_to_chat_contacts_table(context, *chat_id, &[new_contact_id])
.await?;
context.emit_event(EventType::ChatModified(*chat_id));
}
Err(err) => {
warn!(
context,
"New address {:?} is not valid, not doing AEAP: {:#}.",
new_addr,
err
)
}
}
}
}
chat::add_info_msg_with_cmd(
context,
*chat_id,
&msg,
SystemMessage::Unknown,
timestamp_sort,
Some(timestamp),
None,
None,
)
.await?;
}
chatlist_events::emit_chatlist_changed(context);
// update the chats the contact is part of
chatlist_events::emit_chatlist_items_changed_for_contact(context, contact_id);
Ok(())
}
/// Adds a warning to all the chats corresponding to peerstate if fingerprint has changed.
pub(crate) async fn handle_fingerprint_change(
&self,
context: &Context,
timestamp: i64,
) -> Result<()> {
if self.fingerprint_changed {
self.handle_setup_change(context, timestamp, PeerstateChange::FingerprintChange)
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
/// Do an AEAP transition, if necessary.
/// AEAP stands for "Automatic Email Address Porting."
///
/// In `drafts/aeap_mvp.md` there is a "big picture" overview over AEAP.
pub(crate) async fn maybe_do_aeap_transition(
context: &Context,
mime_parser: &mut crate::mimeparser::MimeMessage,
) -> Result<()> {
let info = &mime_parser.decryption_info;
let Some(peerstate) = &info.peerstate else {
return Ok(());
};
// If the from addr is different from the peerstate address we know,
// we may want to do an AEAP transition.
if !addr_cmp(&peerstate.addr, &mime_parser.from.addr)
// Check if it's a chat message; we do this to avoid
// some accidental transitions if someone writes from multiple
// addresses with an MUA.
&& mime_parser.has_chat_version()
// Check if the message is encrypted and signed correctly. If it's not encrypted, it's
// probably from a new contact sharing the same key.
&& !mime_parser.signatures.is_empty()
// Check if the From: address was also in the signed part of the email.
// Without this check, an attacker could replay a message from Alice
// to Bob. Then Bob's device would do an AEAP transition from Alice's
// to the attacker's address, allowing for easier phishing.
&& mime_parser.from_is_signed
// DC avoids sending messages with the same timestamp, that's why `>` is here unlike in
// `Peerstate::apply_header()`.
&& info.message_time > peerstate.last_seen
{
let info = &mut mime_parser.decryption_info;
let peerstate = info.peerstate.as_mut().context("no peerstate??")?;
// Add info messages to chats with this (verified) contact
//
peerstate
.handle_setup_change(
context,
info.message_time,
PeerstateChange::Aeap(info.from.clone()),
)
.await?;
let old_addr = mem::take(&mut peerstate.addr);
peerstate.addr.clone_from(&info.from);
let header = info.autocrypt_header.as_ref().context(
"Internal error: Tried to do an AEAP transition without an autocrypt header??",
)?;
peerstate.apply_header(header, info.message_time);
peerstate
.save_to_db_ex(&context.sql, Some(&old_addr))
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Type of the peerstate change.
///
/// Changes to the peerstate are notified to the user via a message
/// explaining the happened change.
enum PeerstateChange {
/// The contact's public key fingerprint changed, likely because
/// the contact uses a new device and didn't transfer their key.
FingerprintChange,
/// The contact changed their address to the given new address
/// (Automatic Email Address Porting).
Aeap(String),
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::test_utils::alice_keypair;
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_peerstate_save_to_db() {
let ctx = crate::test_utils::TestContext::new().await;
let addr = "hello@mail.com";
let pub_key = alice_keypair().public;
let peerstate = Peerstate {
addr: addr.into(),
last_seen: 10,
last_seen_autocrypt: 11,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
public_key: Some(pub_key.clone()),
public_key_fingerprint: Some(pub_key.fingerprint()),
gossip_key: Some(pub_key.clone()),
gossip_timestamp: 12,
gossip_key_fingerprint: Some(pub_key.fingerprint()),
verified_key: Some(pub_key.clone()),
verified_key_fingerprint: Some(pub_key.fingerprint()),
verifier: None,
secondary_verified_key: None,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
secondary_verifier: None,
backward_verified_key_id: None,
fingerprint_changed: false,
};
assert!(
peerstate.save_to_db(&ctx.ctx.sql).await.is_ok(),
"failed to save to db"
);
let peerstate_new = Peerstate::from_addr(&ctx.ctx, addr)
.await
.expect("failed to load peerstate from db")
.expect("no peerstate found in the database");
assert_eq!(peerstate, peerstate_new);
let peerstate_new2 = Peerstate::from_fingerprint(&ctx.ctx, &pub_key.fingerprint())
.await
.expect("failed to load peerstate from db")
.expect("no peerstate found in the database");
assert_eq!(peerstate, peerstate_new2);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_peerstate_double_create() {
let ctx = crate::test_utils::TestContext::new().await;
let addr = "hello@mail.com";
let pub_key = alice_keypair().public;
let peerstate = Peerstate {
addr: addr.into(),
last_seen: 10,
last_seen_autocrypt: 11,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
public_key: Some(pub_key.clone()),
public_key_fingerprint: Some(pub_key.fingerprint()),
gossip_key: None,
gossip_timestamp: 12,
gossip_key_fingerprint: None,
verified_key: None,
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
verifier: None,
secondary_verified_key: None,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
secondary_verifier: None,
backward_verified_key_id: None,
fingerprint_changed: false,
};
assert!(
peerstate.save_to_db(&ctx.ctx.sql).await.is_ok(),
"failed to save"
);
assert!(
peerstate.save_to_db(&ctx.ctx.sql).await.is_ok(),
"double-call with create failed"
);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_peerstate_with_empty_gossip_key_save_to_db() {
let ctx = crate::test_utils::TestContext::new().await;
let addr = "hello@mail.com";
let pub_key = alice_keypair().public;
let peerstate = Peerstate {
addr: addr.into(),
last_seen: 10,
last_seen_autocrypt: 11,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::Mutual,
public_key: Some(pub_key.clone()),
public_key_fingerprint: Some(pub_key.fingerprint()),
gossip_key: None,
gossip_timestamp: 12,
gossip_key_fingerprint: None,
verified_key: None,
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
verifier: None,
secondary_verified_key: None,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
secondary_verifier: None,
backward_verified_key_id: None,
fingerprint_changed: false,
};
assert!(
peerstate.save_to_db(&ctx.ctx.sql).await.is_ok(),
"failed to save"
);
let peerstate_new = Peerstate::from_addr(&ctx.ctx, addr)
.await
.expect("failed to load peerstate from db");
assert_eq!(Some(peerstate), peerstate_new);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_peerstate_load_db_defaults() {
let ctx = crate::test_utils::TestContext::new().await;
let addr = "hello@mail.com";
// Old code created peerstates with this code and updated
// other values later. If UPDATE failed, other columns had
// default values, in particular fingerprints were set to
// empty strings instead of NULL. This should not be the case
// anymore, but the regression test still checks that defaults
// can be loaded without errors.
ctx.ctx
.sql
.execute("INSERT INTO acpeerstates (addr) VALUES(?)", (addr,))
.await
.expect("Failed to write to the database");
let peerstate = Peerstate::from_addr(&ctx.ctx, addr)
.await
.expect("Failed to load peerstate from db")
.expect("Loaded peerstate is empty");
// Check that default values for fingerprints are treated like
// NULL.
assert_eq!(peerstate.public_key_fingerprint, None);
assert_eq!(peerstate.gossip_key_fingerprint, None);
assert_eq!(peerstate.verified_key_fingerprint, None);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn test_peerstate_degrade_reordering() {
let addr = "example@example.org";
let pub_key = alice_keypair().public;
let header = Aheader::new(addr.to_string(), pub_key, EncryptPreference::Mutual);
let mut peerstate = Peerstate {
addr: addr.to_string(),
last_seen: 0,
last_seen_autocrypt: 0,
prefer_encrypt: EncryptPreference::NoPreference,
public_key: None,
public_key_fingerprint: None,
gossip_key: None,
gossip_timestamp: 0,
gossip_key_fingerprint: None,
verified_key: None,
verified_key_fingerprint: None,
verifier: None,
secondary_verified_key: None,
secondary_verified_key_fingerprint: None,
secondary_verifier: None,
backward_verified_key_id: None,
fingerprint_changed: false,
};
peerstate.apply_header(&header, 100);
assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Mutual);
peerstate.degrade_encryption(300);
assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Reset);
// This has message time 200, while encryption was degraded at timestamp 300.
// Because of reordering, header should not be applied.
peerstate.apply_header(&header, 200);
assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Reset);
// Same header will be applied in the future.
peerstate.apply_header(&header, 300);
assert_eq!(peerstate.prefer_encrypt, EncryptPreference::Mutual);
}
}